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Abstract. Bug patterns are coding idioms that may make the code less
maintainable or turn into bugs in future. The state-of-the-art tools for
detecting concurrency bug patterns (CBPs) perform simple, intraproce-
dural analyses. While this simplicity makes the analysis fast, it does
not provide protection against CBPs that involve aliasing or multiple
methods. This paper introduces a practical and extensible framework,
Keshmesh, which employs advanced static analysis for detecting CBPs.
Keshmesh builds upon the points-to analysis of WALA, a static anal-
ysis framework, and the user interface of FindBugs, a popular bug pat-
tern detection tool. Keshmesh detects five CBPs using interprocedural
analyses and fixes two of them. The challenges in automatic detection
of these CBPs include reducing the rate of false positives, scaling to
large projects, and accurate propagation of unsafe accesses along the call
graph up to synchronization constructs. Keshmesh found 40 previously
unknown CBP instances and only 12 false positives in six open-source
projects. Programmers fixed 11 of the 20 issues we reported. These re-
sults show that Keshmesh is applicable to large projects, finds CBPs
that programmers want to fix, and reports few false positives.
1 Introduction
Bug patterns are coding idioms that are likely to result in confusion or unex-
pected results. For instance, the use of the return value of getClass() as a
synchronization object is a bug pattern, because it may yield unexpected syn-
chronization behaviors in the presence of subclasses and inner classes (Sec. 2.2).
Though a bug pattern may not cause an actual bug, it is recommended that
programmers avoid bug patterns for three major reasons. First, bug patterns may
cause actual bugs in future as the software evolves. Second, it is often cheaper to
fix bug patterns before they turn into actual bugs. Third, a bug pattern makes
it difficult for programmers to infer the intended behavior of the code, reducing
the maintainability of code.
Even experienced programmers introduce obvious bug patterns [10]. The re-
sults of a recent study at Google showed that a considerable number of simple
bug patterns persist through tests and code reviews [4]. Error-prone [4], a bug
pattern detection tool, found a total of 302 instances of six simple bug patterns,
such as “Empty if statement”, “Exception created but not thrown”, and “Ob-
jects.equal self assignment”, in Google’s code base. The desire to eradicate bug
patterns has led to the popularity of FindBugs [1], an automatic bug pattern
detector.
Concurrency bug patterns (CBPs) are a class of bug patterns specific to con-
current programs. Many CBPs are complex and their precise detection requires
points-to or interprocedural analyses. The SEI CERT catalog [14] is a recent and
comprehensive catalog of CBPs for Java.
Existing bug pattern detectors employ intraprocedural analyses and ignore
aliasing relations. Such simple analyses lead to inaccurate results and leave the
code unprotected against complex bug patterns that involve aliasing or multiple
methods.
This paper introduces Keshmesh, a practical framework that brings ad-
vanced static analysis to CBP detectors. Keshmesh builds upon the strengths
of WALA [3], a modern static analysis framework, and FindBugs, a popular bug
pattern detector. The SEI CERT catalog has rated the severity, likelihood, and
remediation cost of each bug pattern. We prioritized the CBPs based on these
three attributes and selected five of the top ten CBPs. We built Keshmesh to
detect a generalized form of these five CBPs and provide automated fixes for two
of them. Along the way, we gradually factored the common machineries of the
detectors and fixers into an extensible framework. This framework makes it eas-
ier to add support for other CBPs. Nonetheless, due to the complexity of CBPs,
extending Keshmesh to support a new CBP is still a nontrivial programming
task.
We leveraged the infrastructure provided by WALA for points-to and inter-
procedural analysis to implement custom analyses for detecting five CBPs. To
overcome the scalability issues of points-to analysis, Keshmesh customizes the
context-sensitivity of WALA and limits the analysis to parts of the program
reachable from the methods annotated by the user as entry points. Keshmesh
presents its findings to users through the user interface of FindBugs. This inte-
gration with FindBugs makes Keshmesh easily accessible to the large user base
of FindBugs and compatible with existing continuous integration systems.
The Keshmesh framework provides two key features for detecting CBPs.
First, it uses a hybrid notion of context-sensitivity (Sec. 4.2) for points-to analy-
sis that strikes a good balance between scalability and accuracy. The hybrid
context-sensitivity of Keshmesh uses type-sensitivity for Java Development
Kit (JDK) classes, call-site sensitivity (kCFA) for static methods, and object-
sensitivity for instance methods. Second, Keshmesh provides an interprocedu-
ral, synchronization-aware data flow framework for propagating thread-unsafe
accesses along the call graph (Sec. 3.2).
Keshmesh found 51 instances of CBPs and only 12 false positives in six
open-source projects (Apache Tomcat, Apache Commons Pool, OkHttp, PyDev,
Derby, and Elevator), 40 of which were not previously known. We reported these
findings in the form of 20 issues to the issue tracking systems of the corresponding
projects. The programmers fixed 11 of the reported issues. These results show
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that Keshmesh is applicable to real-world, large programs, has a low rate of
false positives, and finds bug patterns that developers want to remove (Sec. 5).
This paper contributes to the detection of CBPs in several ways:
1. We introduce Keshmesh, a practical framework for detecting and fixing
CBPs. Keshmesh is open source and available at http://keshmesh.cs.
illinois.edu.
2. We developed novel algorithms for detecting two CBPs (Sec. 3.2) that re-
quired sophisticated interprocedural analysis.
3. We used the Keshmesh framework to implement five CBP detectors and
two fixers. The variety of the supported bug patterns shows the extensibility
of the framework.
4. Keshmesh found 40 new instances of CBPs in real-world open-source soft-
ware.
5. We tuned our analysis to make Keshmesh accurate and applicable to large
programs. The evaluation results show that the object sensitivity level of
the points-to analysis has little impact on the running time and accuracy of
Keshmesh.
2 Bug Patterns
This section presents real-world instances of five of the ten highly-rated CBPs of
the SEI CERT catalog [14]. Keshmesh supports all of these five bug patterns.
2.1 BP1: Synchronizing on an object that may be reused
Objects such as interned strings and boxed primitive values may be reused.
For example, boxings of a primitive int value may yield objects with equal
or different identities, depending on the magnitude of the int value. Due to
the intricacies of the conditions that determine whether such objects may be
reused, locking the monitor associated with these objects may result in unex-
pected behavior. For synchronization, programmers should use objects whose
identities can be compared easily, without the need to refer to the Java language
specification. This bug pattern corresponds to bug pattern “LCK01-J: Do not
synchronize on objects that may be reused” from the SEI CERT catalog [14].
Fig. 1a shows an instance of BP1 (Sec. 2.1) in PyDev.
2.2 BP2: Synchronizing on the class object returned by getClass()
Though any object can be used for synchronization, the use of the return value of
the method getClass as a lock object is misleading. The method call e.getClass()
returns the Class object of the object that the expression e evaluates to. An
interaction of using the return value of method getClass as a lock object with
other features such as subclasses or inner classes can lead to improper synchro-
nizations. Fig. 2a illustrates an instance of BP2 (Sec. 2.2) in Tomcat.
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1 public class PyOutlinePage ... {
2 ...
3 private volatile Integer linkLevel= 1;
4 void unlinkAll() {
5 synchronized (linkLevel) {
6 linkLevel--;
7 if (linkLevel == 0) {
8 removeSelectionListener(...);
9 if (linkWithEditor != null) {
10 linkWithEditor.unlink();
11 }
12 }
13 }
14 }
15 }
(a) An instance of BP1 in PyDev, which was
fixed in Git commit 927add5. Line 5 uses an
object of type Integer as a lock object.
1 public ... class SourceChannel ... {
2 final ReentrantLock lock;
3 ...
4 final InputStream asInputStream() {
5 ...
6 synchronized (this.lock) {
7 InputStream stream = this.stream;
8 if (stream == null)
9 this.stream = stream = new ...;
10 return stream;
11 }
12 }
13 }
(b) An instance of BP3 in JaXLib
(Subversion revision 1427). Line 6 uses
ReentrantLock as the lock object of a
synchronized block.
Fig. 1: Real examples of BP1 and BP3.
1 class javaURLContextFactory ... {
2 Context getInitialContext(...) ... {
3 ...
4 synchronized (getClass()) {
5 if (initialContext == null) {
6 initialContext = ...;
7 }
8 }
9 return initialContext;
10 }
11 }
(a) An instance of BP2 in Tomcat. Line 4
uses the return value of getClass() as a
lock object. This instance was fixed in Git
commit 06b8609.
1 class clojureURLContextFactory extends
2 javaURLContextFactory {
3 Context getInitialContext(...) ... {
4 ...
5 synchronized (getClass()) {
6 initialContext = ...;
7 }
8 return initialContext;
9 }
10 }
(b) The methods getInitialContext
in clojureURLContextFactory and
javaURLContextFactory (Fig. 2a) do
not synchronize their accesses to the
shared variable initialContext properly,
because getClass() returns different
objects in the two classes.
Fig. 2: An example of how an instance of BP2 can turn into a bug as the code
evolves.
Fig. 2b is a hypothetical example illustrating how an interaction of getClass
and sublassing can result in unexpected results. If programmers add a new class,
called clojureURLContextFactory, which subclasses javaURLContextFactory
(Fig. 2a), they may mistakenly assume that it is safe to protect the shared
variable initialContext in the subclass by mimicking the behavior of the su-
perclass and locking the return value of getClass. However, since getClass
returns different objects when called in a class and subclass, concurrent accesses
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to the shared variable initialContext through javaURLContextFactory and
its subclass may conflict.
Similarly, using the return value of getClass as a lock object in a pair of
outer and inner classes can lead to improper synchronization. Bug pattern BP2 is
based on bug pattern “LCK02-J: Do not synchronize on the class object returned
by getClass()” from the SEI CERT catalog [14].
2.3 BP3: Synchronizing on a high-level concurrency object
We consider a class that implements the Lock or Condition interfaces of the
java.util.concurrent.locks package a high-level concurrency object. Although
the monitor associated with any object can be locked by a synchronized block,
the use of a high-level concurrency object in such a way is misleading. This is
because a high-level concurrency object is meant to be used as a lock through
its specific API methods. This bug pattern is based on bug pattern “LCK03-J:
Do not synchronize on the intrinsic locks of high-level concurrency objects” from
the SEI CERT catalog [14]. Possible fixes are to lock the monitor associated with
an instance of Object or to lock and unlock the high-level concurrency object
by calling its lock() and unlock() methods, if any. Fig. 1b (line 6) shows an
instance of BP3 (Sec. 2.3) in JaXLib.
2.4 BP4: Using an instance lock to protect a shared static variable
A single object should be used to protect a shared static variable. If the object
used as the lock is a non-static field, then multiple instances of the class may
access the shared static variable through different lock objects, leading to con-
flicting accesses to the shared variable. Thus, it is safer to protect accesses to a
shared static variable by a static variable.
This bug pattern is based on bug pattern “LCK06-J: Do not use an instance
lock to protect shared static data” from the SEI CERT catalog [14]. BP4 general-
izes this bug pattern by considering any object reachable from a static field as
shared static data not just static fields. We made this generalization because
objects that are reachable from a static field are likely to be shared across
multiple instances of the class. Fig. 3a contains an instance of BP4, because it
uses an instance lock (line 4) to protect accesses to static field id (line 6). Note
that the synchronized modifier of a method is equivalent to a synchronized
block on object this (an instance variable) that wraps the whole method body.
2.5 BP5: Unprotected accesses to shared variables
A non-volatile variable whose accesses are not properly protected by synchro-
nization and locking may yield a data race. The CERT catalog [14] contains
two bug patterns for unprotected accesses to shared variables: VNA00-J and
VNA01-J. We have generalized VNA00-J and VNA01-J by not restricting the
shared data to primitive variables or references to immutable objects. BP5 con-
siders unprotected accesses to any shared data, including primitive variables,
references to immutable, and references to mutable objects as bug patterns.
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1 public class SocketConnector ... {
2 ...
3 static int id = 0;
4 synchronized NioThread getSelector() {
5 if (selector == null) {
6 String name = "Selector-" + id++;
7 selector = new NioThread(name);
8 }
9 return selector;
10 }
11 }
(a) An instance of BP4 in a Tomcat mod-
ule (Subversion revision 1435416). Method
getSelector uses an instance lock (this)
to protect an access to the shared static
field id on line 6.
1 public class FastQueue {
2 private boolean enabled = true;
3 boolean add(...) {
4 ...
5 if (!enabled) {
6 if (log.isInfoEnabled())
7 log.info(...);
8 return false;
9 }
10 ...
11 }
12 void setEnabled(boolean enable) {
13 enabled = enable;
14 if (!enabled) {
15 lock.abortRemove();
16 last = first = null;
17 }
18 }
19 ...
20 }
(b) An instance of BP5 in Tomcat. Field
enabled (line 2) is shared data, but, its ac-
cesses (lines 5, 13, and 14) are not mutually
exclusive.
Fig. 3: Real examples of BP4 and BP5.
VNA00-J: Ensure visibility when accessing shared primitive variables
Fig. 3b illustrates an instance of VNA00-J. In this example, accesses to the
shared primitive variable enabled are not protected (lines 2, 5, 13, and 14).
VNA01-J: Ensure visibility of shared references to immutable objects
Like primitive variables, accesses to shared references have to be protected, even
if the references refer to immutable objects.
Fixes In general, there are three possible solutions to unprotected accesses to
shared variables.
1. Make the shared variable volatile.
2. Use classes of java.util.concurrent.atomic, which support lock-free thread-
safe programming on single variables, e.g., AtomicBoolean and AtomicRef-
erence.
3. Protect accesses to the shared variable using a lock or monitor.
All of the above fixes are applicable to the example in Fig. 3b.
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3 Algorithms
This section presents the algorithm for detecting each bug pattern accompanied
by pseudocodes. The helper functions used in the pseudocodes are defined in
Tab. 1.
To simplify the presentation of the algorithms for detecting BP4 and BP5, we
assume a normalized form of the program. However, the actual implementation
of Keshmesh supports the original non-normalized form. The normalization
replaces every synchronized method by a non-synchronized method with a
synchronized block wrapping its whole body. For static methods, the syn-
chronized block uses the corresponding class literal as its lock expression, and
for instance methods, the synchronized block uses this as its lock expression.
Table 1: Descriptions of the helper functions used in the pieces of pseudocode.
Functions whose names are self-explanatory are omitted.
Function Input Output
callGraph E, a set of entry
methods
a context-sensitive call graph created by WALA
and rooted at the methods in E
nodes G, a graph the nodes of G
instructions N , a call-graph
node
the bytecode instructions in the WALA’s inter-
mediate representation (IR) of N
pointsToSet V , an IR variable the set of objects that V may point to
pointedBySet O, a set of ob-
jects
the set of variables that may point to a subset
of O
type O, an object the type of O
callGraphNode p, a variable the call graph node containing p
method N , a call graph
node
the method corresponding to N
isThreadSafe T , a type Are the fields of the class likely to be accessed
concurrently?
declaringClass F , a field the class declaring the field
possibleCallSites N1, N2 call graph
nodes
the set of possible call sites in N1 to N2
3.1 BP1–3: Synchronizing on objects not suitable for locking
To detect BP1–3, Keshmesh examines the lock object of every synchronized
block. WALA’s IR contains a monitorenter instruction for each synchronized
block in the source code. If the variable of the monitorenter instruction may
point to an object unsuitable for locking, Keshmesh reports the synchronized
block as containing an instance of BP1–3 (Fig. 4).
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input : E, a set of entry methods
output : the set of instances of BP1–3
1 B ← ∅
2 foreach N ∈ nodes(callGraph(E)) do
3 foreach I ∈ instructions(N ) do
4 if I = monitorenter V then
5 foreach O ∈ pointsToSet(V ) do
6 if isUnsuitableForLocking(O) then
7 B ← B ∪ { I }
8 return B
Fig. 4: The template of the algorithm for detecting BP1–3. Function isUnsuit-
ableForLocking has to be customized for each of the bug patterns BP1–3.
BP1: Synchronizing on an object that may be reused Keshmesh de-
tects reusable objects by examining their allocation sites. More precisely, Kesh-
mesh defines the function isUnsuitableForLocking in Fig. 4 such that it re-
turns true if and only if the allocation site of O is in one of the following lo-
cations: String.intern, Integer.valueOf, Long.valueOf, Long.LongCache.-
<clinit>, Short.valueOf, Short.ShortCache.<clinit>, Byte.ByteCache.-
<clinit>, Boolean.<clinit>, Float.valueOf, Double.valueOf.
Fig. 5a shows two synchronized blocks. Since the lock expressions of both
blocks point to an object allocated inside String.intern, Keshmesh reports
both as instances of BP1. Note that an intraprocedural analysis, like that of
FindBugs, can identify the first synchronized block (line 3) as an instance of
BP1, but not the second one (line 8). This is because the declared return type
of method m2 is Object.
1 void m1() {
2 String lock = "LOCK";
3 synchronized (lock) {
4 ...
5 }
6 }
7 void m2() {
8 synchronized (getLock()) {
9 ...
10 }
11 }
12 Object getLock() {
13 return new String("LOCK").intern();
14 }
(a) Keshmesh marks both synchronized
blocks (lines 3 and 8) as instances of BP1.
1 void m() {
2 synchronized (getLock()) {
3 ...
4 }
5 }
6 Object getLock() {
7 return getClass();
8 }
(b) Keshmesh marks the synchronized
block (line 2) as an instance of BP2.
Fig. 5: Keshmesh can accurately detect complex variants of BP1 and BP2 that
require interprocedural and points-to analyses.
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BP2: Synchronizing on the class object returned by getClass() Kesh-
mesh inspects the allocation site of an object to determine if the object is re-
turned by getClass(). That is, Keshmesh defines the function isUnsuitable-
ForLocking in Fig. 4 such that it returns true if and only if the type of O is
Class and the allocation site of O is method Object.getClass. Relying on an
interprocedural points-to analysis empowers Keshmesh to detect indirect uses
of getClass() as the lock expression of a synchronized block (Fig. 5b). Find-
Bugs, as an example of a tool that is limited to intraprocedural analysis, cannot
detect the instance of BP2 in Fig. 5b.
Fixer If the objects that the lock expression points to are of the same class,
say C, Keshmesh provides an automated fix to replace the lock expression by
C.class.
BP3: Synchronizing on a high-level concurrency object Keshmesh con-
siders an object that implements either the Lock or Condition interface a high-
level concurrency object. Thus, it defines the function isUnsuitableForLocking
in Fig. 4 such that it returns true if and only if O is a high-level concurrency
object.
Fixer In addition, if the high-level concurrency object, say O, implements the
Lock interface, Keshmesh provides the user with an automated fixer. If the user
applies the fixer, it will replace the synchronized block by a try-finally block,
which invokes O.lock() at the beginning of the try block and O.unlock() in
the finally block.
3.2 BP4–5: Unprotected access to shared data
The rest of this section describes our algorithms for detecting BP4 and BP5.
First, we introduce a synchronization-aware framework that both detectors use
to propagate unsafe accesses along the call graph. Then, we explain how the two
detectors build upon this framework.
Synchronization-aware propagation of unsafe accesses A common in-
terprocedural part of our algorithms for detecting BP4 and BP5 is to propa-
gate unsafe accesses along the call graph up to safe synchronized blocks. The
detectors for BP4 and BP5 use this framework by defining functions unsafe-
Accesses, isSafeSynchronizedBlock, and mayEscapeUnsafeAccesses. Func-
tion unsafeAccesses(N) returns those accesses in call graph node N that the
detector considers unsafe and would like to propagate along the call graph. is-
SafeSynchronizedBlock(B) returns true if and only if synchronized block B
can protect the unsafe accesses inside it and make them safe. Safe synchronized
blocks prevent further propagation of unsafe accesses. Function mayEscapeUn-
safeAccesses(C) returns true if and only if the call site C may escape the
unsafe accesses of the callee to the caller. If the unsafe accesses cannot escape
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from the callee, the framework does not propagate them to the caller. Fig. 6
shows the formulation of the propagation framework as an interprocedural data-
flow framework. The framework first computes the unsafe accesses within each
call graph node. Then, for each call site C corresponding to call graph edge
N1 → N2, if C may escape unsafe accesses and it is not enclosed by a safe syn-
chronized block, the framework iteratively propagates the unsafe accesses of
N2 to N1. This propagation terminates when the map P reaches a fixed-point.
input : G, the call graph
output : P , a map from each call graph node (N) to the set of unsafe accesses
propagated to N (PN ).
function: propagateAccesses(G)
1 MeetOperator ← ∪
// Initialize the map P.
2 foreach N ∈ G do
3 PN ← unsafeAccesses(N )
// Define the edge transfer function.
4 ΦE ← function N1, N2 do
5 foreach C ∈ possibleCallSites(N1, N2) do
6 if mayEscapeUnsafeAccesses(C) and 6 ∃B B ∈
synchronizedBlocks(N1) and doesEnclose(B, C) and
isSafeSynchronizedBlock(B) then
7 return PN2
8 else
9 return ∅
10 solveDataFlowProblem(G, MeetOperator, P , ΦE)
11 return P
Fig. 6: BP4–5: This function propagates the unsafe instructions of each method
along the call graph up to safe synchronized blocks. The propagation is for-
mulated as an interprocedural data-flow problem, which is solved through a
fixed-point iteration.
BP4: Using an instance lock to protect a shared static variable Kesh-
mesh detects instances of BP4 in several steps:
1. Compute the set SF of static fields of the program.
2. Override function isSafeSynchronizedBlock (Fig. 6) such that isSafe-
SynchronizedBlock(B) returns true if and only if B = monitorenter R
and the points-to set of R is a nonempty subset of that of SF .
3. Override function mayEscapeUnsafeAccesses to always return true.
4. Override function unsafeAccesses (Fig. 6) such that it returns the instruc-
tions that may access an object pointed to by a static field. More con-
cretely, let unsafeAccesses(N) return all instructions I ∈ N , where may-
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ModifyStaticField(I, SF ) (Fig. 8) is true and I is not enclosed by any safe
synchronized block, as defined by function isSafeSynchronizedBlock.
5. Instantiate the synchronization-aware data-flow framework (Fig. 6) to prop-
agate unsafe accesses along the call graph up to safe synchronized blocks.
6. For each call graph nodeN , collect the set of instructions that may directly or
indirectly (interprocedurally) access an object reachable from SF by holding
instance lock. In other words, for each call graph node N , take the union
of the set PN computed by the data-flow framework (Fig. 6) and the set of
method calls in N that have propagated some unsafe accesses to N while
solving the data-flow framework.
The propagation of unsafe accesses, which is an interprocedural step of the
analysis, is necessary to handle cases such as the one illustrated in Fig. 7.
1 class SocketConnector {
2 static int id = 0;
3 static Object staticLock = new Object();
4 void getSelectors() {
5 synchronized (staticLock) {
6 getSelector();
7 }
8 getSelector();
9 }
10 NioThread getSelector() {
11 return new NioThread(id++);
12 }
13 }
Fig. 7: This hypothetical example shows that the interprocedural analysis of BP4
is necessary to distinguish the safe (line 6) and unsafe (line 8) indirect accesses
to field id (line 2).
input : I, an instruction
SF , a set of static fields
output : A boolean value indicating whether the instruction I may modify a
static field in SF
function: mayModifyStaticField(I, SF)
1 if I = putstatic V F then
2 return not isFinal(F)
3 else if I = putfield R V F then
4 return pointsToSet(R) ∩ pointsToSet(SF) 6= ∅
Fig. 8: BP4: This function checks if an instruction may modify a static field.
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BP5: Unprotected accesses to shared variables To detect BP5, Keshmesh
needs to identify the instructions that may unsafely access some shared data.
Keshmesh assumes that a class that implements Runnable, extends Thread,
or contains a synchronized block is meant to be thread-safe. It then treats all
objects reachable from the fields of thread-safe classes as shared data. An in-
struction may access shared data indirectly by calling another method. Finding
such unsafe accesses requires an interprocedural reasoning. Keshmesh instanti-
ates the synchronization-aware data-flow framework (Fig. 6) to propagate unsafe
accesses along the call graph. The data-flow framework transfers unsafe accesses
from a callee to its caller if at least one argument of the method invocation
may be shared data and the call site is not enclosed by a synchronized block.
Keshmesh detects instances of BP5 in several steps:
1 public class A {
2 int counter = 0;
3 @EntryPoint
4 public static void main(String args[]) {
5 A a = new A();
6 a.m();
7 }
8 void m() {
9 /* [VNA00J,01 */ counter++;/* ] */
10 /* [VNA00J,02 */ increment();/* ] */
11 synchronized (new Object()) {
12 counter++;
13 increment();
14 }
15 }
16 void increment() {
17 /* [VNA00J,03 */ counter++;/* ] */
18 }
19 }
Fig. 9: A test input from Keshmesh suite of tests for BP5. Lines 9, 10, and 17 are
marked as expected instances of BP5. The Keshmesh testing framework ensures
that the actual instances of BP5 found by Keshmesh match the expected ones
marked in the input file. Keshmesh does not report any instances of BP5 on
lines 12 and 13, because they are inside a synchronized block. It also does not
report an instance of BP5 on line 6 because the only argument of the method
invocation, which in this case is the receiver, is not reachable from a method
parameter or static field.
1. Find the set of classes that are meant to be thread-safe. In Fig. 9, Keshmesh
considers class A as a class meant to be thread-safe, because it contains a
synchronized block.
2. Find the instructions in each call graph node that may access some shared
data (Fig. 10). Keshmesh considers accesses to final and volatile fields
as safe (Fig. 10, lines 2–3). For the remaining accessed fields, if the field is
static and belongs to a thread-safe class, Keshmesh considers it shared
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input : I, an instruction
N , a call graph node
output : A boolean flag indicting whether instruction I in N may access some
shared field
function: mayAccessSharedField(I, N )
1 if I = getfield Result, Reference, Field or I = putfield Reference, Value, Field
or I = getstatic Result, Field or I = putstatic Value, Field then
2 if isVolatile(Field) or isFinal(Field) then
3 return false
4 if I = getstatic Result, Field or I = putstatic Value, Field then
5 if isThreadSafe(declaringClass(Field)) then
6 return true
7 else
8 P ← pointedBySet(pointsToSet(Reference))
9 hasExternalPointer ← ∃p∈P isLocalVariable(p) and
callGraphNode(p) 6= N and not
isInitialization(method(callGraphNode(p)))
10 hasThreadSafePointer ← ∃p∈P isThreadSafe(type(p))
11 hasThreadSafeFieldPointer ← ∃p∈P isField(p) and
isThreadSafe(type(container(p)))
12 return hasExternalPointer and (hasThreadSafePointer or
hasThreadSafeFieldPointer)
Fig. 10: BP5: This function determines if an instruction may access some shared
field.
input : Var, a program variable
N , a call graph node
output : A boolean flag indicating whether the variable may get the value of a
method parameter or static field.
function: isReachableFromMethParamOrStaticField(Var, N )
1 if Var ∈ parameters(method(N )) then
2 return true
3 I ← def(Var)
4 if I = getstatic Result, Field then
5 return true
6 else if I = getfield Result, Reference, Field then
7 return isReachableFromMethParamOrStaticField(Reference, N )
8 else
9 return false
Fig. 11: BP5: This function determines if a local variable of a method may get
the value of a method parameter or static field. It recursively follows the def-use
chain until it reaches a local variable, method parameter, or static field.
data (Fig. 10, lines 4–6). If the accessed field is non-static and does not
correspond to a field of a local variable, Keshmesh considers it shared data.
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1 public class A {
2 @EntryPoint
3 public static void main(String args[]) {
4 new B().accessNonLocally();
5 new B().accessLocally();
6 new C().increment();
7 }
8 }
9 class B {
10 C c1 = new C();
11 void accessNonLocally() {
12 /* [VNA00J,01 */ c1.counter = 1;/* ] */
13 if (c1.finalCounter == 0) {
14 c1.staticVolatileCounter = 1;
15 }
16 }
17 void accessLocally() {
18 C c2 = new C();
19 c2.counter = 1;
20 /* [VNA00J,02 */ c2.staticCounter = 1;/* ] */
21 }
22 }
23 class C implements Runnable {
24 int counter = 0;
25 static volatile int staticVolatileCounter = 0;
26 final int finalCounter = 0;
27 static int staticCounter = 0;
28 void increment() {
29 /* [VNA00J,03 */ counter++;/* ] */
30 }
31 public void run() { /*...*/ }
32 }
Fig. 12: A test input from the Keshmesh suite of tests for BP5 that exercises
function MayAccessSharedField (Fig. 10). Keshmesh marks line 12 as con-
taining an access to shared data, because field B.c1 is an external pointer to
the object accessed on this line, i.e., counter. Lines 13 and 14 are not marked
because they involve final and volatile fields. Keshmesh does not mark line
19 because there is no external pointer to the object accessed on this line.
More precisely, Keshmesh looks for the existence of an external pointer,
i.e., a pointer to the accessed object from a different call graph node (Fig.
10, lines 8–9). If there exists an external pointer that has a thread-safe type
or is the field of a thread-safe type, Keshmesh considers the accessed field
shared data (Fig. 10, lines 10–12). Fig. 12 shows examples of instructions that
Keshmesh considers as ones accessing shared data. In Fig. 9, Keshmesh
concludes that the instructions corresponding to lines 9, 12, and 17 may
access shared data.
3. Override function unsafeAccesses(N) such that it returns any instruction
I ∈ N that may access some shared data (i.e., mayAccessSharedField(I,N)
= true) but is not enclosed by a synchronized block in call graph node N .
In Fig. 9, Keshmesh treats the instructions on lines 9 and 17 as unsafe
accesses.
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4. Override function isSafeSynchronizedBlock(B) in Fig. 6 to always return
true, because this bug pattern considers accesses protected by any syn-
chronized block as safe accesses.
5. Override function mayEscapeUnsafeAccesses(C) in Fig. 6 to return true
if the method call C has some method argument a such that isReachable-
FromMethParamOrStaticField(a) = true (Fig. 11).
6. Instantiate the synchronization-aware data-flow framework (Fig. 6) to prop-
agate unsafe accesses across the call graph. In Fig. 9 Keshmesh propagates
the instruction on line 17 to line 10, but, it does not propagate the instruction
to line 13.
7. Collect the instructions of each call graph node to report to the user. For
every call graph node N , Keshmesh reports any instruction of N that may
access some shared field unsafely (i.e., PN , where P is the map returned
by the data-flow framework). In addition, it reports any method calls in
N that has propagated some instructions to N while solving the data-flow
framework problem. For the example in Fig. 9, Keshmesh reports instances
of BP5 on lines 9, 10, and 17.
4 Framework
Keshmesh is an extensible framework, which provides common functionalities
for detecting and fixing CBPs. Nonetheless, adding a new bug pattern detector
to Keshmesh is still a nontrivial programming task. However, our experience
shows that the framework does make it easier to add new detectors and fixers.
For example, one of the authors joined the team after two bug patterns were
implemented. By reusing the framework, this author was able to implement two
bug patterns much faster than what it took the other two authors to imple-
ment bug patterns of comparable complexity. This anecdotal evidence indicates
the productivity gained by reusing the Keshmesh framework. The rest of this
section gives an overview of several reusable design elements of Keshmesh.
4.1 User-specified entry methods
Users can specify which parts of the program they want Keshmesh to analyze.
This feature allows the user to focus the analysis on the concurrent parts of
the code. Users can use the @EntryPoint annotation to specify certain methods
as entry points. Keshmesh collects the set of methods annotated as such and
configures WALA to build a call graph rooted at these methods. Fig. 9 illustrates
an example in which the main method is annotated with @EntryPoint.
4.2 Call graph construction and points-to analysis
Keshmesh customizes WALA in two ways. First, it configures WALA’s target
method selectors to bypass the methods in third-party JAR files, and thus, limit
the size of the call graph.
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Second, Keshmesh uses a hybrid context-sensitivity for building the call
graph and points-to analysis. The hybrid context-sensitivity consists of k-object-
sensitivity or type-sensitivity for instance methods, 1-call-site sensitivity for non-
instance methods, and type-sensitivity for Java Development Kit (JDK) classes.
Users of Keshmesh can provide a configuration file to choose between type-
sensitivity or k-object-sensitivity for instance methods.
Call-site sensitivity differentiates object allocations and methods by call-site
labels. With 1-call-site sensitivity, a method is conceptually cloned for each of
its call-sites and each clone is analyzed separately. In general, k-call-site sensi-
tivity uses a chain of up to k call sites that lead to the method invocation to
differentiate the method and its object allocations.
We chose object-sensitivity because of the accumulating evidence [7, 12, 13,
17,23] in the literature that object-sensitivity yields better precision and cost for
object-oriented programs. k-object-sensitivity uses the labels of allocation sites
to distinguish object allocations and methods that would have otherwise been
collapsed into the same entity. For example, 1-object-sensitivity conceptually
clones a method for each of its different receivers. In general, k-object-sensitivity
uses a chain of up to k receivers to distinguish methods and object allocations.
4.3 Synchronization-aware propagation of unsafe accesses
Keshmesh builds upon the data-flow framework of WALA to provide a frame-
work for propagating unsafe accesses along the call graph (Fig. 6). BP4 and
BP5 use this framework for computing indirect (through method calls) unsafe
accesses to shared data.
4.4 Reasoning about the structure of concurrent Java programs
Keshmesh provides utilities to inspect the concurrency constructs. For instance,
it provides methods to obtain positions of WALA’s instructions in source code,
check if an instruction is within a given synchronized block, and an intrapro-
cedural escape analysis.
4.5 Integration with FindBugs
Keshmesh integrates with the user interface of the FindBugs plug-in for Eclipse.
Keshmesh integrates both the detectors and fixers with FindBugs. FindBugs
can be extended by third-party detectors. We have used this feature of FindBugs
to integrate the detectors of Keshmesh with it. This allows the user to get the
results of Keshmesh detectors by running FindBugs as before.
FindBugs fixers are not as extensible as its detectors. We had to patch the
source code of the FindBugs plug-in for Eclipse to make the fixers of Keshmesh
available in FindBugs. Keshmesh fixers use the AST Rewrite API of Eclipse
JDT to fix instances of the bug patterns. The main AST rewriting part of the
fixers are independent of FindBugs.
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4.6 Unit testing detectors and fixers
We implemented a testing framework for Keshmesh to test both its detectors
and fixers. This framework enables the programmer to write test Java programs
augmented with inline comments that specify the expected instances of bug
patterns and fixers. The testing framework automatically runs Keshmesh on
the test programs and compares the outcomes of the detectors and fixers with
the ones specified in the comments. Fig. 9 shows an example input file for testing
the detection of BP5.
5 Evaluation
This section reports the results of the experiments that we carried out to answer
the following research questions.
RQ1 Does Keshmesh find problems in real-world applications?
RQ2 Does Keshmesh find problems that programmers want to fix?
RQ3 Is Keshmesh applicable to large projects?
RQ4 What is the false positive rate of Keshmesh?
RQ5 How does the degree of context sensitivity affect the accuracy and scala-
bility of Keshmesh?
RQ6 How does Keshmesh compare to other bug and bug pattern detectors?
5.1 RQ1: Does Keshmesh find problems in real-world applications?
We found true instances of all CBPs (BP1–5) in open-source projects. The ma-
jority of these instances belong to BP5. Perhaps the complexity of BP5 is the
reason for its high frequency in real-world applications.
BP1–3 Keshmesh found one previously unknown instance of bug pattern BP2
(in Tomcat) and no such instances for bug patterns BP1 and BP3. We manually
inspected all synchronized blocks in PyDev, and Tomcat, and did not find
any instances of these bug patterns (except the one detected by Keshmesh).
This manual inspection confirmed that the lack of reports were not due to the
potential false negatives of Keshmesh.
Since Keshmesh found few previously unknown instances of BP1–3, we
searched bug reports and commit histories of several projects for known in-
stances of BP1–3 in older revisions.
We found five known instances of BP1: two in Jetty, two in PyDev, and one
in Toolbox for Java/JTOpen. We found three known instances of BP2: two in
Google App Engine and one in SQuirreL SQL Client. Keshmesh detected a
previously unknown instance of BP2 in Tomcat. We also found one previously
known instance of BP3 in JaXLib. Keshmesh could have detected all of these
known bug pattern instances. When we ran Keshmesh on PyDev, we confirmed
that it finds the two known instances of BP1.
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BP4 Searching the older revisions, we manually identified four known instances
of BP4: one in each of Tomcat Modules, XalanJ2, Harmony, and Derby. Kesh-
mesh could have detected all these known instance of BP4. When we ran Kesh-
mesh on Derby, we confirmed that Keshmesh finds Derby’s known instance of
BP4.
BP5 Overall, Keshmesh detected 39 previously unknown instances of BP5
(Tab. 4). We also found a total of 11 known instances of BP5, and confirmed
that Keshmesh can detect four of them, which appear in the applications we
ran Keshmesh on (Tab. 4).
5.2 RQ2: Does Keshmesh find problems that programmers want to
fix?
We ran Keshmesh on six projects (Tab. 2). Keshmesh found 51 instances of
CBPs, 40 of which were previously unknown true CBPs. We reported 20 (1 BP2
and 19 BP5) issues based on the findings of Keshmesh. The programmers fixed
11 (1 BP2 and 10 BP5) of these issues. This indicates that Keshmesh finds
problems that programmers want to fix. For example, one programmer wrote to
us:
Nice find on the [...] bug. I have no idea how you found it, but it’s a real
problem and I got a fix out. The threading code [...] is pretty subtle, especially
[...] where there’s a lot of threads to coordinate. I’d love to do more static
analysis on it to figure out where the other problems are.
5.3 RQ3: Is Keshmesh applicable to large projects?
Tab. 2 shows the number of lines of code for each project. All projects ex-
cept Elevator are medium to large real-world applications, which shows that
Keshmesh scales well. Since we are interested in CBPs, we employed several
heuristics to select entry points. First, we detected concurrency constructs like
synchronized and volatile keywords as well as Thread and Runnable types.
Then, we marked as entry points those methods whose call graph would contain
the detected concurrency constructs. Our experience shows that establishing
entry points is straightforward and does not require a deep knowledge of the
underlying code. As an anecdotal evidence, three undergraduate students who
worked in two independent groups were able to select appropriate entry points.
The students found instances of CBPs in Tomcat and OkHttp. Tab. 3 shows
that Keshmesh finished in under a minute for the applications that we ran it
on (except OkHttp with unbounded object-sensitivity). We ran Keshmesh while
allocating up to 3G of RAM to Eclipse. The bottleneck of Keshmesh is in the
preprocessing step, which computes the call graph and points-to information.
In each run, Keshmesh performs the preprocessing step once and shares the
results with the detectors.
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Table 2: The analyzed applications
Project Description Size (LOC) Repository
Apache
Derby
a relational database management
system
616,780 github.com/-
apache/derby
Apache
Tomcat
an implementation of the Java
Servlet and JavaServer Pages tech-
nologies
589,526 github.com/-
apache/tomcat
PyDev an Eclipse-based IDE for Python 461,325 github.com/-
aptana/Pydev
OkHttp an HTTP+SPDY client for Android
and Java applications developed at
Square, Inc.
13,139 github.com/-
square/okhttp
Apache
Commons
Pool
an object-pooling library 10,029 github.com/-
apache/-
commons-pool
Elevator a benchmark program for evaluating
tools on parallel programs
350 pjbench.-
googlecode.com
5.4 RQ4: What is the false positive rate of Keshmesh?
If the code can be made safer in response to a report generated by Keshmesh,
we consider the report a true positive, otherwise, a false positive. Keshmesh
reported a low number of false positives (12).
Keshmesh did not report any false positives for BP1–3. It reported one false
positive for BP4 in a recent revision of Tomcat. Tab. 4 shows the rate of false
positives for BP5.
5.5 RQ5: How does the degree of context sensitivity affect the
accuracy and scalability of Keshmesh?
We ran Keshmesh with different levels of k-object-sensitivity (Tab. 3). When
k = 0, Keshmesh uses type-sensitivity instead of object-sensitivity for instance
methods. When k > 0, Keshmesh uses k-object-sensitivity. When k = ∞,
object-sensitivity does not bound the number of receivers for characterizing the
contexts.
Tab. 3 shows that the level of context-sensitivity had little impact on con-
struction time and size of the call graph. Moreover, Keshmesh reported the
same CBP instances regardless of the level of context-sensitivity. The only sig-
nificant effect was that Keshmesh did not terminate in 15 minutes when run on
OkHttp with unbounded object-sensitivity (Tab. 3). Overall, the degree of con-
text sensitivity for instance methods of the application code did not affect the
scalability and accuracy of Keshmesh in practice. However, in theory, higher
levels of context-sensitivity lead to higher accuracy. Fig. 13 is a contrived ex-
ample showing that 1-object-sensitivity produces a false positive that 2-object-
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Table 3: Call graph size and running time of Keshmesh for different object-
sensitivities. The times are reported in milliseconds. Entry stands for entry
point. Context denotes the level of object-sensitivity. CG stands for call graph.
Application C
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x
t
C
G
n
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e
s
C
G
ti
m
e
B
P
1
ti
m
e
B
P
2
ti
m
e
B
P
3
ti
m
e
B
P
4
ti
m
e
B
P
5
ti
m
e
Apache Derby 5a93780 1
0 7 4280 0 0 0 455 7
1 7 4212 0 0 0 588 8
2 7 4124 0 0 0 699 8
3 7 3879 0 0 0 544 7
∞ 7 3710 0 0 0 516 8
Apache Tomcat
f0d9854 1
0 2102 10515 3 3 2 1330 533
1 2102 10644 3 3 2 1205 528
2 2102 10017 3 2 2 1165 550
3 2102 10697 3 3 2 1123 373
∞2102 8946 3 2 2 1114 585
4fa4f90 4
0 3550 16575 6 5 5 5677 973
1 3567 15211 6 4 5 6189 765
2 3589 14969 6 4 5 6741 1140
3 3600 16082 7 5 5 7383 1208
∞3607 15820 6 4 5 7322 1103
PyDev
7332bcf 1
0 1675 19277 5 1 1 1848 695
1 1675 22585 4 1 1 1943 487
2 1675 18845 4 1 1 1850 826
3 1676 17785 5 2 2 2333 865
∞1676 18895 5 2 1 1903 723
20ee5bd 2
0 1707 17514 3 1 3 938 1052
1 1707 17793 3 1 3 846 911
2 1707 20154 3 1 3 814 898
3 1707 19570 3 1 3 801 880
∞1707 18533 3 1 2 750 884
OkHttp 9bed92f 2
0 3832 12054 6 4 5 2082 1344
1 3864 11150 6 4 4 1990 1674
2 3873 11777 5 4 4 2188 1768
3 3880 10957 6 4 5 2035 1726
∞ – – – – – – –
Apache Commons Pool b0294a0 2
0 1817 8048 2 2 2 766 755
1 1841 7916 2 2 2 892 646
2 1853 8174 2 2 2 889 463
3 1857 8291 2 2 2 874 579
∞1857 8141 3 2 3 828 462
Elevator 213 1
0 1895 10128 4 2 2 885 763
1 1895 9028 4 2 2 958 565
2 1895 9690 4 3 2 728 663
3 1896 10015 4 3 2 991 734
∞1896 9782 5 3 3 765 716
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Table 4: Statistics about the instances of BP5. Known stands for the number of
known true positives that Keshmesh found. Unknown stands for the number
of previously unknown true positives that Keshmesh found. Reported stands
for the number of true positives that Keshmesh found and we reported. Fixed
stands for the number of true positives that we reported and the developers
fixed. False Positives stands for the number of false positive that Keshmesh
reported.
Application K
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e
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e
P
o
si
ti
v
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Apache Derby 1 – – – –
Apache Tomcat 1 14 8 6 0
PyDev 2 10 4 0 4
OkHttp 0 9 6 3 1
Apache Commons Pool 0 1 1 1 1
Elevator 0 5 0 0 5
Overall 4 39 19 10 11
sensitivity does not. The obscurity of this example explains why additional levels
of object-sensitivity do not affect the accuracy of Keshmesh in practice.
5.6 RQ6: How does Keshmesh compare to other bug and bug
pattern detectors?
We compared Keshmesh with FindBugs [1], a popular bug pattern detector,
and Chord [17], a well-known static data race detector.
FindBugs can detect those instances of bug patterns BP1–3 that do not
require interprocedural and alias analyses. This includes the instances of BP1–3
mentioned in Sec. 5.1. However, FindBugs cannot protect against more complex
variants of BP1–3 (Fig. 5). Moreover, limited analysis capabilities of FindBugs do
not allow it to detect any instances of bug patterns BP4 and BP5. Consequently,
FindBugs would not detect 39 out of 40 unknown CBP instances that Keshmesh
detected.
Keshmesh and Chord have different focuses and complement each other.
Keshmesh detects CBPs while Chord detects data races. To compare Kesh-
mesh and Chord, we ran both tools on Tomcat using the same entry points.
Keshmesh detected eight true positives for BP5 and one false positive for BP4,
while Chord reported only a false positive and a true positive related to BP5.
This result shows that Keshmesh is more effective at finding bug patterns than
Chord. Besides, as we showed above, developers are interested in fixing not only
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1 public class A {
2 @EntryPoint
3 public static void main(String[] args) {
4 B b1 = new B();
5 synchronized (new Object()) {
6 b1.setD(new ThreadSafeD());
7 }
8 B b2 = new B();
9 b2.setD(new D());
10 b2.d.value = 0;
11 }
12 }
13 class B {
14 public D d;
15 void setD(D d) {
16 C.instance.setD(this, d);
17 }
18 }
19 class C {
20 public static C instance = new C();
21 void setD(B b, D d) {
22 b.d = d;
23 }
24 }
25 class D {
26 int value;
27 }
28 class ThreadSafeD extends D implements Runnable {
29 public void run() { }
30 }
Fig. 13: A contrived example that illustrates the impact of context sensitivity
on the accuracy of Keshmesh. With 1-object-sensitivity, Keshmesh reports an
instance of BP5 on line 10. An object-sensitivity level of at least two is needed to
distinguish between the object allocations on lines 6 and 9 and avoid reporting
a false positive.
bugs but also bug patterns—11 of the bug patterns detected by Keshmesh have
already been fixed. At the same time, Chord detected four data races that do not
belong to any bug pattern supported by Keshmesh. Thus, bug pattern detec-
tors like Keshmesh and data race detectors like Chord complement each other
well.
6 Related Work
There are numerous studies that try to improve the quality of concurrent pro-
grams. Two core techniques for detecting concurrency related issues are dynamic
analysis and static analysis.
6.1 Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis techniques instrument the programs and analyze them at run
time [6, 11, 16, 19, 20, 22, 25]. The key advantage of dynamic approaches is the
22
absence of false alarms since they work on real execution of the programs. How-
ever, since they only exercise a limited number of inputs and only the paths
executed at run time, they suffer from poor coverage. Moreover, dynamic analy-
sis approaches require the program to be executed, which is a burden especially if
the program needs complex environmental setup. Another drawback of dynamic
approaches is the runtime overhead.
6.2 Static Analysis
Unlike dynamic analysis, static analysis techniques do not require program ex-
ecution since they work on the abstract model of the programs. The abstract
model allows static analysis to have better coverage than the one achieved by
dynamic analysis. However, the imprecise nature of the abstract model makes
static analysis prone to a large number of false alarms.
Most of the static analysis tools aim for detecting real concurrency bugs, while
a few of them target detecting CBPs, which is useful not only for detecting real
bugs, but also for advocating best practices in concurrent programming.
Bug Detectors Static bug detectors aim for detecting various concurrency bugs.
JLint [5] is one of the early tools that uses a limited interprocedural analysis
to find deadlocks and data races in concurrent Java programs. Chord [17] is
a well-known tool for detecting data races in concurrent Java programs. The
race detection algorithm combines different kinds of static analysis to detect the
pair of accesses involved in the race. RaceFreeJava [9] is a formal race-free type
system for Java that statically detects data races.
Relay [24], and RacerX [8] are static race detectors for C programs that use
variants of the lockset algorithm to make the tool scalable. KISS [21] is a tool
that detects data races by transforming a concurrent C program to a sequential
program which represents a subset of program behavior.
While all of these tools are developed for detecting concurrency bugs, Kesh-
mesh focuses on detecting CBPs.
Bug Pattern Detectors Concurrency bug pattern detectors check for the misuses
of concurrency constructs that may lead to real concurrency bugs at run time.
The most closely related work to Keshmesh is RSAR [15]. RSAR is a
static analysis tool that combines syntactic pattern matching and WALA’s inter-
procedural analysis to detect seven bug patterns. However, only the detector
of one bug pattern uses WALA’s inter-procedural analysis. All other detectors
employ simple syntactic pattern matching. Keshmesh has two key advantages
over RSAR. First, Keshmesh leverages much of the power of WALA, including
inter-procedural analysis, to detect the CBPs more accurately. Second, Kesh-
mesh detects CBPs listed in a systematically developed catalog of bug patterns,
namely, the SEI CERT catalog [14].
SyncChecker [18] is a bug pattern detector that tries to reduce false alarms.
It uses the Java framework Soot [2] and combines it with points-to and may-
happen-in-parallel (MHP) information to report fewer false alarms. One of the
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differences between Keshmesh and SyncChecker is that the bug patterns de-
tected by SyncChecker are not based on any standard catalog and hence they
are different from the bug patterns detected by Keshmesh. Moreover, Sync-
Checker was not executed on large applications, which makes the scalability of
the tool opaque.
FindBugs [10] is one of the most popular tools for detecting bug patterns in
Java programs. The tool uses syntactic and intra-procedural data flow analysis to
detect various bug patterns. Although the simple analysis makes this tool fast, it
limits the accuracy and power of the tool in detecting bug patterns. Keshmesh
employs interprocedural and alias analysis built on top of the WALA framework
to address this limitation of FindBugs.
7 Conclusions
Unlike concurrency bugs, concurrency bug patterns (CBPs) may not cause a
failure, but make the code less maintainable and are likely to turn into bugs as
the code evolves. Thus, it is recommended to avoid bug patterns.
Existing CBP detectors support an ad-hoc set of bug patterns, do not scale
to large programs, or cannot detect CBPs that cross multiple methods or involve
aliasing.
We introduce a new framework, Keshmesh, which combines the power of
a modern static analysis framework, WALA, with the ease of use of FindBugs,
a popular bug pattern detector. Keshmesh provides detectors for five of the
bug patterns of the SEI CERT catalog and fixers for two of them. In addition,
Keshmesh provides a hybrid context-sensitivity tuned for its detectors and a
synchronization-aware data-flow framework for interprocedural propagation of
thread-unsafe accesses. The evaluation results show that advanced static analysis
is applicable to CBP detection, leading to an effective and scalable CBP detector.
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